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RAWLS, RACE, AND REASON
Sheila Foster*
One of the provocative questions posed by this conference is the
relationship between John Rawls's extensive philosophical work on
justice and matters of race.' As one of the panels queried, what does
Rawls have to say about race-and in particular racial justice-and
what do scholars of race2 have to say about Rawls?
The cursory answer to both questions is "not much." However, this
cursory response does not end the inquiry. Rawls's theory is a theory
of justice, and race scholars are very much engaged in a "justice"
project-inquiring what racial justice might look like and how political
and legal principles might support (or undermine) it. So it is, in the
end, insufficient to say that neither has anything to say about one
another, even if in a formal sense this is true.
Peculiarly, as others have written about here, Rawls said very little
about matters involving race, although he might have easily said
more.3  Similarly, as a quick search in law review databases for
references to "Rawls" and "race" quickly reveals, race scholars have
said very little about Rawls. It is this latter phenomenon that I want
to comment on briefly. Embedded in this latter inquiry is the
suspicion that Rawls and race scholars are speaking past one another.
And, in a very real sense, they are.
The central underpinning of Rawls's theory of justice consists of the
notion that equal and rational people (in the original position/behind
a veil of ignorance) would agree to live by a set of principles decided
upon together. Furthermore that such free and rational people would
agree upon both a liberty principle (that every person has extensive
basic liberty rights), and a difference principle (that social and
economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they benefit the least
advantaged, while upholding equality of opportunity).
* Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law. I am indebted to Peter
Silverman for his expert research assistance.
1. See, e.g., John Rawls, A Theory Of Justice (rev. ed. 1999); John Rawls,
Political Liberalism (1996).
2. Throughout this essay, I equate "scholars of race" with critical race scholars. I
do so out of acknowledgement that most contemporary scholarship on race in legal
literature falls within this genre, broadly speaking.
3. See Anita L. Allen, Race, Face and Rawls, 72 Fordham L. Rev. 1677 (2004);
Tommie Shelby, Race and Social Justice. Rawlsian Considerations, 72 Fordham L.
Rev. 1697 (2004); Seana Shiffrin, Race, Labor, and the Fair Equality of Opportunity
Principle, 72 Fordham L. Rev. 1643 (2004).
1715
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
Although feminists and others have thoughtfully critiqued the
shortcomings of this theory as applied to various groups in society,4
the basic notion behind Rawls's theory stands secure as a very
appealing one: Justice-and in particular just distributions-can be
achieved through a fair process that is open to all-regardless of race,
gender, ethnicity and other characteristics- and which attends to
benefiting those least well off.
Taking this theory at face value, why haven't race scholars
embraced this appealing notion to construct arguments for housing
and educational equality, environmental justice, and the like?
Ultimately, the answer lies in a set of central presumptions embedded
in Rawls's original position, from which contemporary race scholars
diverge.
One of the central questions posed by contemporary race scholars
is: Why, after certain fundamental liberties, rights and social goods
historically denied to certain racial groups have been distributed to
those groups, is there still so much racial injustice that pervades
contemporary society?5 What might a Rawlsian concept of justice
have to say about this basic inquiry? To be sure, Rawls was aware,
and even concerned, on a very foundational level about the problems
of race and racial discrimination in society. As Tommie Shelby
persuasively writes, "[t]he conviction that racial discrimination is
unjust helps to shape Rawls's sense of what is morally relevant and
what is morally arbitrary from the standpoint of social justice."6 This
conviction, as Shelby writes, is enshrined in the original position
where parties do not know their racial identity or the relative social
position of the various races in society so that "[the parties] have no
rational basis for choosing principles that would favor one race over
another" or otherwise entrench existing racial bias.7
Consider also that our antidiscrimination norms (contained both in
civil rights statutes and constitutional jurisprudence) arguably enforce
the neutrality of the original position-i.e., the neutrality of the
process of distribution. The basic principle embraced by
antidiscrimination norms is that basic social goods-housing,
education, and employment-should not be distributed according to
the largely irrelevant characteristics of race, gender, ethnicity and
religion.8 Embedded in this antidiscrimination norm is that once
4. See, e.g., Susan Moller Okin, Justice and Gender: An Unfinished Debate, 72
Fordham L. Rev. 1537 (2004).
5. See generally KimberI6 Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform and Retrenchment:
Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 1331
(1988).
6. Shelby, supra note 3, at 1699.
7. Id. at 1700.
8. See Robert Post, Prejudicial Appearances: The Logic of American
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stripped of the influence of these characteristics, decisions about what
fair social institutions and distributions might look like can be made in
a reasoned, rational and impartial fashion.'
This is classical liberalism at its best, in its assumption of a subject
free to choose (autonomous individual), the existence of an objective
reality (like principles of justice) that can be discerned, and reason-
"the bridge between the subject and the object that enables subjects to
move from their own blindness to 'enlightenment. "'10 Contemporary
race scholars, however, consciously diverge from the assumptions of
classical liberalism (that characterize much of traditional civil rights
discourse and law), and hence from Rawlsian notions of justice. That
is, the very heuristic-that of reason, rationality, and impartiality-
underlying Rawls's A Theory of Justice is itself a problem for "racial
justice."
For contemporary race scholars, the answer to why so much racial
injustice persists today is answered by a deep skepticism and
interrogation about reason, rationality and impartiality themselves. As
critical race scholars have powerfully argued, race/racism is not
something that can easily be rendered "irrelevant" or neutralized. As
Angela Harris writes, race scholars believe that "racism is not only a
matter of individual prejudice and everyday practice; rather, race is
deeply embedded in language, perceptions, and.., even 'reason'
itself."'1 So in the turn away from classical liberalism, race scholars
embrace the notion that "racism is an inescapable feature of western
culture, and race is always already inscribed in the most innocent and
neutral-seeming concepts."' 2  Moreover, as history has constantly
shown, "racism can coexist happily with formal commitments to
objectivity, neutrality, and colorblindness."' 3
As such, the antidiscrimination guarantee, and the Rawlsian
Antidiscrimination Law, 88 Cal. L. Rev. 1, 10 (2000) ("'In passing Title VII,' the
Court has said, 'Congress made the simple but momentous announcement that sex,
race, religion, and national origin are not relevant to the selection, evaluation, or
compensation of employees."' (quoting Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228,
239 (1989) (Brennan, J., plurality opinion))).
9. Id. at 11. As a result, American antidiscrimination law typically requires
employers, except in exceptional and discrete circumstances such as affirmative
action, to make decisions as if their employees did not exhibit forbidden
characteristics, as if, for example, employees had no race or sex. This is what
underwrites the important trope of "'blindness' that 'has played a dominant role in
the interpretation of antidiscrimination prohibitions."' Id. "Blindness renders
forbidden characteristics invisible; it requires employers to base their judgments
instead upon the deeper and more fundamental ground of 'individual merit' or
'intrinsic worth."' Id.
10. Angela P. Harris, Foreword: The Jurisprudence of Reconstruction, 82 Cal. L.
Rev. 741, 751 (1994).
11. Id. at 743.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 759.
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neutrality that it mirrors, can both "discredit and rationalize practices
that perpetuate racial stratification."' 4 Whether this tension between
liberal justice and racial justice is expressed in the debate around
individual versus group rights, race-consciousness versus
colorblindness, the central dilemma is the same. The abstract
individual in the original position is very difficult for race scholars to
reconcile with the historical and continuing reality of racial
subordination. As Glen C. Loury has recently remarked in rejecting
liberal justice in favor of "racial justice," "I cannot abide the
imposition of abstract strictures of neutrality upon a game in which
systematically nonneutral practices have left so many raced and
stigmatized outsiders with so few good cards to play. '15
Thus, where Rawlsian justice ultimately places faith in the existence
of reason, rationality and impartiality, race scholars would put each of
these concepts at the center of the justice inquiry and interrogate
them. For instance, contemporary race scholars seek to expose the
racism within seemingly neutral concepts-like "reasonableness" and
"merit"-that are employed by decision makers when distributing
social goods, and that shroud decision-making processes in a cloak of
rationality and impartiality.16  They have critically probed the
operation of social structures-like the market-that are hidden
beneath the veil of reason and naturalized. 7 And, most of all, they
would place race (and racial subordination) at the center of analysis in
asking whether certain distributional outcomes are fair or just.
In the final analysis, however, contemporary race scholars are
deeply ambivalent about a complete turn away from classical liberal
tenets. As the literature suggests, they want to neither completely
jettison nor uncritically privilege the Rawlsian faith in reason and
impartiality. That is, on the one hand, race scholars recognize that an
uncritical reliance on such tenets underlies some of the most
intractable problems of racial stratification and injustice in our society
today. On the other hand, "faith in reason and truth and belief in the
essential freedom of rational subjects have enabled people of color to
14. Reva B. Siegel, Discrimination in the Eyes of the Law: How "Color
Blindness" Discourse Disrupts and Rationalizes Social Stratification, 88 Cal. L. Rev.
77, 106 (2000).
15. Glen C. Loury, The Anatomy of Racial Inequality 122 (2002).
16. See, e.g., Jody David Armour, Negrophobia and Reasonable Racism: The
Hidden Costs of Being Black in America (1997); Sheila Foster, Difference and
Equality: A Critical Assessment of the Concept of "Diversity," 1993 Wis. L. Rev. 105,
130-47; Susan Sturm & Lani Guinier, The Future of Affirmative Action: Reclaiming
the Innovative Ideal, 84 Cal. L. Rev. 953, 968-97 (1996); David B. Wilkins, On Being
Good and Black, 112 Harv. L. Rev. 1924 (1999) (reviewing Paul M. Barrett, The
Good Black: A True Story of Race in America (1999)).
17. Luke W. Cole & Sheila R. Foster, From the Ground Up: Environmental
Racism and the Rise of the Environmental Justice Movement 58-70 (2001).
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survive and resist subordination. 8
Ultimately, the tenets of classical liberal theory, and hence
Rawlsian justice, represent a sort of "moral utopianism' 19 that is
essential for all of us who care about "justice" to hold on to, even if
their promises have yet to be fully realized. Rawls's belief in the
ability of reason to lead to just results, and that attending to the needs
of those less well off is the obligation of every rational person, is
undeniably alluring in its power to beckon the best qualities in each of
us. Contemporary race scholars certainly do not aim to undermine
these principles, or to ignore their moral force. Indeed, what both
contemporary race scholars and Rawls ultimately share, I believe, is a
desire to make these aspirational principles and goals real for those
who have held onto them for so long without reaping their promises.
In this sense, Rawls and race scholars aren't so much speaking past
one another as they are having a difficult time finding a common
fertile ground in which to plant the seeds of justice.
18. Harris, supra note 10, at 753; see also Mari J. Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom:
Critical Legal Studies and Reparations, 22 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 323, 357 (1987);
Patricia J. Williams, Alchemical Notes: Reconstructing Ideals from Deconstructed
Rights, 22 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 401,433 (1987).
19. I borrow this term from Patricia J. Williams, The Pain of Word Bondage, in
The Alchemy of Race and Rights: Diary of a Law Professor 146, 154 (1991).
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